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1  Introduction** 
Gross National Happiness (GNH) as a political program 
carries with it the ambition to make a difference to real policy 
decisions. Whatever the precise understanding of GNH, it was 
always intended to be more than a purely theoretical concept 
and to make a direct difference to policy making and, what is 
more, to actual development paths. Yet, whatever policy 
recommendations we derive from our reflections on GNH, the 
question arises as to how these recommendations may 
legitimately find their way into reality. Certainly nobody 
suggests to forcefully impose any policy recommendations 
against universal public resistance, however sensible the 
policy in question might be. 
 
In the context of GNH, two problems in particular arise. First 
is the question of whether a happiness-based policy in 
particular and policy recommendations in general do not 
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conflict with democratic principles. Second is the question of 
whether the claims GNH makes on each individual’s personal 
attitudes and behaviour are not illusory and/or illegitimate. I 
will treat these two questions in turn in this essay and will try 
to show that neither is the case. 
2 Does a happiness-based policy conflict with democratic 
principles? 
For good reasons, debates about policy interventions, however 
controversial they may be, nowadays take place under the 
premise of democracy. The literature that does not subscribe 
to this premise is outdated or marginal and cannot hope to 
get any substantive public approval. This seems to apply also 
to Bhutan where a democratic spirit and democratic practices 
have a long history (Galay 2001) and where the draft 
constitution contains an explicit commitment to fundamental 
democratic principles in its very first two clauses.1 At the 
same time, democracy is a very general idea that can be 
specified in many different ways. However, to the degree the 
name speaks for itself (from its Greek origin, “rule by the 
people”) it means that political decisions, institutions etc. 
must ultimately originate from, and be justified in terms of, 
the will of the people. 
 
With such a conception, it may appear at first sight that the 
formulation of policy recommendations by social scientists 
would be (ethically) illegitimate and (factually) ineffective. 
After all, those elected into power are supposed to execute the 
electorate’s mandate and not to implement policy 
recommendations that some more or less brilliant scientist 
has been able to convince them of. And since people naturally 
know what is good for them—and what will make them 
happy—democracy would simply demand that political 
representation mirror people’s preferences and that economic 
activity take place on free markets (since these would 
maximize total happiness). Against happiness policies in 
particular it might be argued that they have anti-liberal 
tendencies because they are illegitimately interested in 
people’s private lives. 
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Many writers on GNH would disagree (cf. the contributions in 
Ura & Galay 2004). They might argue, for example, that those 
elected into political offices should be inspired and 
conscientious leaders, not only mirrors of the median voter’s 
preferences,2 and that completely free markets often have a 
negative overall effect on people’s happiness. 
 
Whatever the precise stance and the underlying arguments, it 
seems clear that one needs a somewhat more refined concept 
of democracy before such arguments can be settled. While the 
space, and the author’s competence, do not permit a 
comprehensive elaboration of such a concept on these pages, 
a convincing concept of deliberative democracy as developed 
by political philosophers shall be briefly presented and 
defended here. 
2.1 Deliberative democracy 
Deliberative democracy can be roughly characterized as “a 
system that combines accountability with a measure of 
reflection and reason-giving” (Sunstein 2002:123). In other 
words, its most distinctive feature as a concept of democracy 
is that it bases democracy on reflective deliberation. In 
contrast, other views of democracy, such as that of the social 
choice theory, starts from the—allegedly value-free—premise 
that people’s tastes, opinions, preferences etc. are not to be 
questioned and that the good social choice mechanism is the 
one that produces the most consistent aggregation of 
preferences that satisfies some common sensical conditions of 
justice, in whatever way these preferences have been formed.3 
Deliberative democracy demands that choices must be made 
after a process of deliberation in which people exchange and 
justify their respective reasons for their preferences. Such a 
process makes it possible, without of course guaranteeing, 
that the preferences people will ultimately state (by vote, 
protest, acquiescence, or active affirmation) are better 
reflected and more sensitive to other people’s moral rights 
and interests. Deliberative democracy should not be 
understood as a procedure leading to, or requiring, 
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consensus. It is rather the very process of reflecting and 
justifying competing interests that should be considered an 
intrinsic procedural benefit of deliberative democracy. 
It may of course be argued that, since consensus is not 
required nor expected, deliberative democracy would boil 
down to the same thing as an aggregation of unreflected 
preferences to the degree that the participants of such 
deliberations fail to be impressed by the arguments of others. 
While this is perhaps technically correct, the premise that 
people will never change their stated preferences upon 
reflection and consideration of others’ moral rights and 
interests would be problematic. First because, as an empirical 
matter, people do regularly adjust their stated preferences 
upon reflection and after being exposed to opposing (or indeed 
supporting) arguments (cf. e.g., Sunstein 2002). Second and 
more important, assuming purely self-interested citizens who 
will never change their mind (that is, who never change their 
mind for moral reasons, as opposed to strategic ones) would 
be quite absurd for a number of reasons, the most important 
being that any discourse on good decision procedures—
including social choice theory itself—would become quite 
pointless and self-contradictory under this premise. There is 
little virtue to be expected from even the imaginably best 
decision procedures that are not complemented by any sense 
of morality on the side of the citizens. I will have to say more 
about this below. 
 
Another critique that has been directed at this model of 
democracy is that extensive deliberation is too costly as that 
it would ever be possible or desirable to submit each single 
decision to public deliberation. Apart from decisions 
restricted to a tiny community, the large majority of decisions 
will always be taken without much or any public deliberation. 
At most, a small subset of the (potentially) affected population 
will be able to participate. Due to this “constraint of 
deliberative economy” (Dryzek 2001:652), opponents argue, 
deliberative democracy is an unfeasible model for actual 
decision making. Ultimately, only more efficient authoritarian 
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models of democratic decision making would be viable 
alternatives. 
 
Fortunately, we do not have to choose between these two 
alternatives only (universal and permanent deliberation vs. 
authoritarianism). The critique just presented should be 
understood as a critique against a caricature of deliberative 
democracy, not against its spirit. Well understood, the 
criterion of deliberative democracy should not be whether 
each single decision is preceded by actual public deliberation, 
but rather whether deliberation can take place as and when 
the need arises and whether decisions anticipate, and are 
responsive to, contestation. Authority, in this conception, is 
not in itself antagonistic towards democracy. To the contrary, 
“democratic authority” (Warren 1996:47) must be a 
constitutive element of any conception of deliberative 
democracy that does not ignore people’s right to freedom from 
constant involvement in public deliberation. In particular, 
“democratic authority can exist when an institutionalized 
possibility of challenge allows individuals to suspend 
judgment” (ibid.) 
 
In this conception, then, policy makers or, more generally, all 
those that have been entrusted by society with decision 
making powers are not simply legitimized by fair procedures 
(of election, appointment etc.) to do whatever they deem right 
once they are in office. Rather, even when they have taken an 
office in a legitimate process, they should continue to remain 
under the scrutiny of the public and be under an obligation to 
justify their decisions. Paradoxically, it is precisely this 
continuous potential challenge that confers democratic 
authority: the very possibility to challenge judgments and 
decisions of officeholders—and the experience that they are in 
principle responsive to such challenge—lays the basis for a 
trust of the citizens in officeholders that allows the citizens to 
partially suspend their judgments on specific decisions 
(Warren 1996:57). It is not that citizens surrender their 
judgment to officeholders between elections, which would be 
pretty much the end of deliberative democracy. It is only that 
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they suspend their judgment on individual decisions, but 
their trust (or its absence) in decision makers is of course in 
its turn a judgment, as is their decision when to realize the 
possibility of challenging authority. It is these judgments that 
permit citizens to partially suspend judgment on specific 
issues (ibid.). Thus, authority is not antagonistic towards 
deliberative democracy, but, to the contrary, a constituent 
element of it. 
2.2 Policy recommendations and deliberative democracy 
Before this background we can now see how policy 
recommendations are after all reconcilable with deliberative 
democracy. The important thing to understand is that there is 
a place for policy recommendations within this concept of 
deliberative democracy, not in addition to it. In other words, 
expert policy recommendations must not bypass the 
democratic procedures that legitimise political decisions, they 
must become an input to the same. This implies that 
decisions based on policy recommendations must be open to 
contestation by the public, as all other decisions must be. 
 
Of course the roles of different actors would be differentiated 
in deliberative democracy. While all actors would be equally 
legitimate participants of the public discourse and would 
therefore be entitled to advocate or challenge specific 
decisions, some actors would have special privileges and 
responsibilities. To begin with, legitimately elected 
officeholders (including those appointed by elected 
authorities, such as ministers or judges) would have certain 
privileges that derive from the simple fact that they have been 
entrusted with decision making on behalf of the electorate. 
Again, this does not mean that, once elected, they are entitled 
to do whatever is just not illegal, but it does mean that they 
are entitled to take decisions without the need to seek explicit 
approval for every single decision, provided that they give a 
chance of challenge to potential opponents. Furthermore, 
special powers of decision or of influence should be 
accompanied by special responsibilities. Thus, a researcher 
who has extensively studied a particular societal issue will 
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rather easily make her voice heard in the media or by 
counselling politicians directly, and there would be nothing 
illegitimate about her giving advice to politicians on what she 
personally believes would be the best policy—as long as the 
public has a chance of challenging her advice. Similarly, 
newspaper editorial writers with considerable influence on 
public opinion have an obligation to particular prudence in 
their published judgments, but the exertion of their influence 
is not as such undemocratic or otherwise illegitimate as long 
as a proper degree of media independence and plurality is 
warranted. 
 
In short, what deliberative democracy requires is that any 
policy recommendation or, more generally speaking, any 
constructive political opinion is an input into, and not a 
substitute of, the democratic process, and that any decision 
taken by officeholders (which will almost inevitably be based 
on one or another policy recommendation) will in principle be 
responsive to public challenge. 
 
This characterization of the institutional preconditions for the 
reconciliation of democratic principles and policy 
recommendations also indicates the limits to form and 
content of policy recommendations that may be submitted to 
the democratic process. First of all, policy recommendations 
whose aim, or incidental effect, is to seriously undermine 
deliberative democracy would not be admissible in the same 
way as an unconstitutional political party would not be 
admissible in a multi-party democracy. “Not admissible” is of 
course meant in the sense of not being morally admissible 
rather than in the sense of being illegal. As long as such 
undemocratic policy recommendations are covered by the 
right to freedom of expression, they should not be suppressed 
by legal sanctions. Being not morally admissible should 
rather imply that such policy recommendations stand no 
chance of being seriously considered in a functioning 
deliberative democracy. 
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Second, when a particular policy recommendation is 
advanced, it should be justified by giving reasons why the 
society should want to adopt that particular policy, rather 
than by purely mechanical arguments based on alleged 
natural social laws. For example, it would be problematic to 
recommend a particular measure, even if it concerns the 
extension of democratic participation rights, based simply on 
statistical evidence that such a measure tends to increase 
citizens’ happiness (as in Frey & Stutzer 2002). Such a 
justification reflects a view of citizens as happiness functions 
and of policy makers as social engineers that have to fulfill 
some independent objectives. It fails to address the reasons 
the citizenry may or may not have to make the recommended 
cause their own (cf. Thomä 2003:155). One does not need to 
deny the existence of causal effects of certain policies on 
people’s wellbeing to demand that such policies always need 
to be justified also and ultimately in terms of the specific, 
contextual reasons people should have to advocate such 
policies in public deliberation. 
 
In addition to (i) the institutional preconditions and (ii) the 
formal and substantive criteria of admissible policy 
recommendations, the reconciliation of policy 
recommendations with deliberative democracy—indeed, 
deliberative democracy itself—requires (iii) an ethical 
predisposition—or simply: morality—on the side of the 
participants of public deliberation, including citizens, experts, 
multipliers and legitimate officeholders. While any democratic 
constitution of society must be able to withstand 
undemocratic and immoral attitudes of a minority, it cannot 
be built upon the assumption of the complete absence of 
morality. I shall try to explain what this implies for policy 
recommendations in general and for GNH related proposals in 
particular. 
2.3 The imputation of morality 
Saying that deliberative democracy requires morality does of 
course not mean that citizens must always do the good and 
never the bad, or that they must be always motivated by pure 
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benevolence. It does not, in other words, mean that citizens 
must be saints. It just means that they respect others’ moral 
rights for other than strategic reasons, i.e., to judge and act 
from the moral point of view. Morality, in this sense, simply 
means that I do not (ab)use the other only as a means in my 
strategic calculus, but that I care also about him or her as a 
vulnerable human being. The criterion is not whether I 
protect another person’s specific interest at any cost to 
myself, but whether I sincerely care about that person’s 
interest and allow it to become, in principle, a reason for me 
to act against my immediate interests. What is necessary in 
deliberative democracy, therefore, is a general readiness to 
critically revise one’s private preferences and/or to act against 
them in the light of others’ justified interests. 
 
Such a conception of democracy is not for the first time 
proposed here, but it may attract criticism from two sides. 
First, it may be criticized that it is unrealistic to expect that a 
significant portion of the citizenry is willing or able to take 
this moral point of view. Whatever the exact arguments of 
such a criticism, it will be either misdirected or simply wrong. 
It would be misdirected if it was meant to criticize the view 
that people would generally sacrifice their own interest for 
those of another. After all, morality in the sense just 
described does not at all imply that the pursuit of one’s own 
interests would in any way be illegitimate as such or that one 
should sacrifice one’s wellbeing for that of others. All it says is 
that the pursuit of one’s interests must be conditional upon 
its respecting the moral rights of others. In other words, the 
pursuit of one’s interests is prima facie legitimate and only 
needs to be justified, and possibly revised, when others’ 
legitimate interests are compromised. The criticism would be 
wrong if it was claimed that, as a matter of fact, people have 
no moral sense. This should be clear once the implications of 
such a claim are understood. The widespread absence of any 
morality would mean, e.g., that we could only communicate 
and interact strategically and would have to suspend any 
trust. The very business of science—defending theories and 
hypothesis by reasoned argument—would become pointless 
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in such a world—in fact, the very justification of the view that 
morality does not exist would become a performative 
contradiction, i.e., it would be an exercise of communicative 
(as opposed to strategic) rationality that is denying its own 
existence. The absurdity of such a claim has been nicely 
caricatured by Amartya Sen (1983:p.96): “‹Where is the 
railway station?› he asks me. ‹There›, I say, pointing at the 
post office, ‹and would you please post this letter for me on 
the way?› ‹Yes›, he says, determined to open the envelope and 
check whether it contains something valuable.” We certainly 
do not live in a world without morality. It would of course be 
futile to attempt to ascertain the exact degree of the 
prevalence of morality. Yet, in the absence of such estimates, 
we will certainly fare better being optimistic about human 
morality than pessimistic, preferring to impute rather a little 
too much morality than too little. 
 
Second, it may be criticized that it is illegitimate to require 
that people change their preferences. This criticism may be 
expected to follow from the standard dogma in economic 
theory that preferences are sacrosanct and not to be 
criticized. As long as negative externalities are internalized 
through the price mechanism, the argument goes, nobody’s 
preferences should be questioned since “a taste for poetry is 
no better than a taste for pushpins” (Frank 1997:1844, citing 
Bentham). This critique, too, is mistaken on several accounts. 
First, the very view that people have given preferences is 
highly implausible and problematic. Rather, human beings 
appear to be constructing their preferences themselves all the 
time, albeit not from scratch and within limits (Hirata 
2003:108). This implies that there usually exists no “genuine” 
preference from which an individual is manipulated away 
through outside influence. Rather, the construction of 
preferences will unavoidably be influenced by communication 
and interaction, and as long as the person is the master of 
her judgments, there should be no reason to fear that she is 
unduly manipulated. 
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Second, it is not only that outside influences are not 
necessarily manipulative. People in fact actively seek outside 
orientation for the sake of rightly choosing their preferences. 
Most people want to live well and responsibly without having 
a complete and ready-made conception of either the good life 
or of legitimacy. Asking themselves how they want to live, who 
they want to be, and what their values should be, they often 
welcome the open-ended deliberation with others even if their 
preferences are challenged in the process. As a reflected 
economist once said, “life is at bottom an exploration in the 
field of values, an attempt to discover values, rather than on 
the basis of knowledge of them to produce and enjoy them to 
the greatest possible extent. We strive to ‘know ourselves,’ to 
find out our real wants, more than to get what we want” 
(Knight 1964:1). 
 
Third, declaring the questioning of others’ preferences 
illegitimate would mean doing away with the idea of ethics, of 
responsibility, rights, and duties altogether. The mere fact 
that a person compensates others for the damage he inflicts 
on them (i.e., the idea of paying for negative externalities) 
does not in itself legitimize the underlying preferences. As 
Brian Barry (1991:264) vividly argues in an analogous 
context, 
 
We will all agree that doing harm is in general not cancelled 
out by doing good, and conversely that doing some good does 
not license one to do harm provided it does not exceed the 
amount of good. For example, if you paid for the realignments 
of a dangerous highway intersection and saved an average of 
two lives a year, that would not mean that you could shoot 
one motorist per year and simply reckon on coming out 
ahead. (quoted in Neumayer 1999:40) 
 
The same case can be made for most negative externalities. A 
rich person may have no difficulties to compensate, say, a 
community of indigenous forest dwellers for their resettlement 
in a different location in order to build a weekend residence 
for himself. Yet, considering the alternatives, one might 
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question whether he should not want to put his fortune to a 
different use and content himself with a less “unsettling” 
weekend destination. Indeed, “the way people allocate money 
is not always optimal from a social point of view” (Thinley 
1999:20). Similarly, we do not only condemn sadistic 
practices but also the desire for such practices, and it is for 
the same reason that the law prescribes harsher punishment 
for homicide when it was committed with “malice 
aforethought” (murder) than when it was committed out of 
recklessness or negligence (manslaughter). The point I want 
to make is that preferences are not morally irrelevant and 
that we are right to demand justification for questionable 
preferences.4 
 
When it is recognized that moral demands can (realistically) 
and may (ethically) be made on citizens, there should be no 
reason to exempt policy recommendations from making moral 
demands. In fact, any policy recommendations that does not 
exclusively address purely opportunistic interests of the 
addressees—i.e., practically all serious policy 
recommendations—will automatically make some moral 
demands. After all, policy recommendations need to be 
justified by reference to some social benefit, not to the private 
advantage that politicians, or indeed voters, may expect to 
reap (“we recommend to abolish eco-taxes in order to make 
more profitable use of defenseless future generations’ 
assets”). Even the public choice school that portrays policy 
makers as purely self-interested agents does not seem to go 
that far in its own policy recommendations. 
 
Happiness-based policy recommendations potentially address 
people’s private ethos (i.e., prudence and morality) much 
more explicitly than policy recommendations based on other 
research, and Gross National Happiness in particular takes 
persons’ attitudes explicitly into the equation, as a key 
passage from Lyonpo Jigme Y. Thinley’s Millenium Meeting 
address emphasizes: 
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The knowledge of the self is important to attain individual 
liberty and freedom, to gain happiness. … I attach a slightly 
different meaning to concepts like freedom and liberty than is 
customarily done. We can gain freedom fundamentally 
through the destruction of delusion, aggression and desire. … 
Happiness depends on gaining freedom, to a certain degree, 
from this particular kind of self-concern [of ‘paying excessive 
attention to our selves, our concerns, needs and likes’]. 
(Thinley 1999:17-18) 
 
Yet, criticizing this as a weakness of the GNH approach would 
again be misguided. As I have just argued, every policy 
recommendation will rightly make some demands on the 
addressees’ ethos—so why not extend the audience to all 
citizens, rather than restricting them to policy makers? 
Indeed, it seems rather inconsistent that most policy 
recommendations—and their underlying theories—do not 
articulate any moral exigencies demanded from citizens. To 
be sure, moral demands alone will hardly make any 
difference, and there exists a danger in overestimating 
people’s receptiveness for moral demands, especially when 
not backed by “institutional backrests” (Ulrich 
2001/1997:319) that reduce the private costs of socially 
responsible behavior. Yet, just as policy makers are usually 
called upon to design good rules of the game (by appealing to 
their responsibility, not to their private advantage), so should 
ordinary citizens be called upon to act virtuously within these 
rules, and be it only for consistency (i.e., not arbitrarily 
excluding citizens from moral demands). Many citizens may 
in fact be eager to understand what virtuous action would 
exactly mean in the context of the recommended rules of the 
game, and explicitly addressing these concerns would enrich, 
rather than patronize or manipulate, public debate.5 
Complementing recommendations for better rules of the game 
by explicitly addressing the role of people’s private ethos 
should therefore be no reason for embarrassment, but rather 
a natural feature of any comprehensive political program or 
policy recommendation. 
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3. How exactly may happiness be expected to influence 
development? 
In light of the conception of deliberative democracy outlined 
above, one should not expect a simple “application” of GNH to 
societies that bypasses the democratic decision making 
process. Yet, the question of how GNH ideas may be expected 
to be transmitted into real-world decision making shall not be 
evaded here with a formal reference to the democratic 
decision making process. While deliberative democracy is a 
rather formal concept, it should be part of the theorist’s job to 
point out how this form might be filled with substance in 
different contexts or scenarios. While I shall not go very deep 
into this issue at this point,6 I will highlight four specific ways 
on different levels in which the concern with happiness, in 
particular as understood in GNH, may be expected to make a 
difference to development. 
 
3.1 Institutional level: provisions to reduce the frame-of-reference 
effect 
Both empirical evidence and theoretical reasoning strongly 
support the notion that poverty is relative and that, as a 
corollary, wellbeing depends on some social frame of 
reference. In particular, I suggest that this frame-of-reference 
effect is driven by at least three distinct social dynamics: 
 
(1) Positional competition (Hirsch 1976) leads people to spend 
money on a positional arms race for status or otherwise for a 
high position in a socio-economic hierarchy that alone can 
provide a valuable (“oligarchic”) privilege. Since the total 
supply of positional goods cannot be augmented by 
productivity gains, however, such competition is, from a 
social welfare point of view, a zero-sum game, and 
expenditures made for positional goods are thus social losses. 
 
(2) Secondary inflation makes a given functioning (Sen 
1985:10) more costly in terms of goods, just as primary (i.e., 
monetary) inflation makes a given good more costly in terms 
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of money units. For example, the deterioration of public 
transport in Los Angeles brought about by the surge in the 
number of private cars now practically obliges families to 
posses a car to function normally in society. Doing one’s 
grocery shopping, e.g., was once a matter of paying for a bus 
ride, but now involves the much higher cost of owning and 
operating a car. 
 
(3) Adaptive aspirations have the effect of reducing the 
satisfaction a person derives from a given functioning because 
exposure to superior goods lead to rising aspirations. For 
example, a state of the art personal computer from five years 
ago would not at all satisfy consumers today because they 
have come to expect better functionality. Similarly, our 
ancestors would not have considered themselves unhappy for 
not having a hot morning shower, but once we got used to it 
we take it for granted and do not derive any positive 
satisfaction from this comfort. 
 
All these effects may be tackled to some degree by smart rules 
of the game, and in fact are already being partially addressed 
(Frank 1999, Layard 2005). Positional competition, e.g., may 
be slowed down by limiting the hours people work; secondary 
inflation might be addressed by long-term policies (e.g., urban 
planning) that expose the secular choices societies confront 
rather than relying on piecemeal decisions of individuals 
(Hirsch 1976, Mishan 1979/1967, Schelling 1974); and 
adaptive aspirations can be addressed by limiting exposure to 
superior consumption goods (by reducing income inequality 
or by banning advertising towards children below the age of 
twelve, as Sweden has done). 
3.2 Individual level: educational effect of knowing about cognitive 
fallacies 
Apart from the just outlined social dynamics which occur 
even if, or precisely when, individuals decide rationally, 
happiness may be compromised by irrational behavior. 
Psychological research has gathered firm evidence that people 
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frequently commit cognitive fallacies when it comes to 
predicting happiness. For example, they often fail to 
anticipate that, and how rapidly, they will adjust to better 
performing computers or hot showers (Frederick & 
Loewenstein 1999). They overestimate the effect of a given 
change in their living conditions for the simple fact that their 
attention is drawn to them (“focusing illusion”; Schkade & 
Kahneman 1998). They also tend to overestimate their taste 
for diversity when anticipating future choices (Read & 
Loewenstein 1995). Publicly debating happiness may raise 
people’s awareness of these effects, and once people know 
about these cognitive fallacies they may be expected to make 
more prudent decisions, just as knowledge about nutritional 
features of different foods has been making a difference to 
people’s diets. 
3.3 Societal level: giving weight to (inter-) subjective arguments 
Prevalent discourses tend to selectively establish legitimizing 
justifications. Our modern time’s veneration of, some would 
say obsession with, objectivity, for example, obliges people to 
justify their judgments and decisions by reference to some 
objective arguments. What is more, people find it prudent in 
terms of their own interest—not only just with respect to 
others’ interests—to base decisions on objective rather than 
subjective criteria. For example, a majority of respondents in 
an experiment said that they would be more satisfied earning 
US$33,000 when their equally qualified colleagues earn 
US$30,000 than earning US$35,000 when their colleagues 
earn US$38,000,. At the same time, however, 84% (of another 
group of respondents) said they would choose the latter 
scenario (Tversky & Griffin 1991:114). Apparently, people do 
not consider their resulting subjective satisfaction to be a 
legitimate reason to act upon, perhaps because “the market 
culture teaches us that money is the source of well-being, 
[and people,] lacking privileged knowledge of the causes of 
their feelings, … accept conventional answers” (Lane 2000:70) 
Here, publicly and seriously debating happiness might help 
do away with the stigma of subjective arguments so that 
reasons are evaluated on their inherent merit and not on 
                                How Should Happiness Guide GNH Policy? 
 17
insignificant formal criteria such as whether they are 
objective or subjective. 
3.4 Conceptual level: acknowledge role of personal attitudes for 
happiness 
Modern social sciences, with the partial exception of 
psychology, have come to restrict their domain of interest to 
living conditions, the rules of the game and social, economic, 
and political systems, as opposed to the inner life of the 
subjects that, after all, constitute such systems. This is also 
true for development theories and has been accompanied in 
most Western societies by an almost exclusive concern in 
public debates with citizens’ (negative) rights and freedoms at 
the exclusion of obligations and behavior-orientating norms. 
Development is seen basically as a matter of building an 
agreeable world around people who are assumed to be 
equipped with all those competencies and attitudes it takes to 
become thriving and well-adjusted citizens once favorable 
living conditions are established. As Scitovsky (1992/1976:4) 
noted, “we are accustomed to blaming the system or the 
economy and have gotten out of the habit of seeking the 
cause of our troubles in ourselves.” 
 
Unfortunately, however, the conditions of life are not always 
agreeable. While there are certainly many aspects of today’s 
“systems” that need to be rectified, people’s attitudes, 
characters, inner strength etc. are also a vital component of 
development. In fact, people’s inner life plays two constitutive 
roles in development. On the one hand, a certain moral 
posture (commitment to basic moral principles, a conception 
of the good etc.) is a requirement for any societal “system” to 
function well (Rawls 1999/1971, Hirsch 1976, Giannetti 
2002). On the other hand, some inner strength and positive 
attitudes are what allows people to live fulfilling lives even 
under not so agreeable living conditions. If public debates 
were centered around happiness rather than economic 
conditions, one might expect that people’s inner life would be 
taken into the equation of development. In this sense, GNH-
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inspired theories appear to be more complete than 
mainstream development approaches that are exclusively 
concerned with the living conditions, and not at all with living. 
4. Conclusion 
Happiness-inspired policy recommendations, I have argued 
here, are neither illegitimate nor illusory, provided that they 
are submitted as justified suggestions to the democratic 
decision making process. As all other policy 
recommendations, they have to prove themselves in the 
public discursive contest of arguments. One argument that 
might turn out to become a particularly convincing feature of 
GNH is its inclusion of the inner life into the domain of 
interest. While people’s inner life is perhaps no direct field of 
policy intervention, it would be an inconsistency and a gross 
omission to conceptualize and debate development without 
taking the role of personal attitudes, ethos, and values into 
account. 
 
There are a number of specific ways in which the shift in 
public debate from economic conditions to happiness may 
affect a society’s development path, i.e., policies as well as 
people’s private lives. I have here defended the view that the 
specific path of good development must be negotiated in a 
given society under the premise of deliberative democracy, 
and that such negotiation makes, and should make, some 
moral demands on the negotiators—the citizens. In other 
words, good development needs both, appropriate rules of the 
game and citizens who care about others’ moral rights. By 
addressing both sides of the equation, GNH brings us a big 
step further towards a more comprehensive conception of 
development. 
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1 The draft constitution as published on 26 March 2005 begins thus 
(after the preamble): “Article 1. Kingdom of Bhutan. 1. Bhutan is a 
Sovereign Kingdom and the Sovereign power belongs to the people of 
Bhutan. 2. The form of Government shall be that of a Democratic 
Constitutional Monarchy. Any other form of Government shall be 
unconstitutional and is prohibited.” 
 
2 The “median voter theorem” is based on the scenario of a binary 
decision (for or against a specific proposal) and says that the 
preferences of the median voter—i.e., the voter who has as many 
voters to his right as to his left in the distribution of approval 
intensities—will prevail as long as decisions reflect majorities. 
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3 Cf. the voluminous literature sparked by “Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem” (Arrow 1951). 
 
4 Furthermore, the very concept of externalities requires some moral 
concept of legitimate preferences. For example, I may find that 
factory noise is an illegitimate nuisance but that the noise of playing 
children should not be disliked in the same way. 
 
5 Moreover, many collective action problems seem to depend 
precisely on the public articulation of behavioral norms as a 
precondition for universal understanding. If a municipality puts up 
glass disposal containers for recycling purposes, for example, there 
would be little use if this measure was not complemented by a 
publicly justified articulation of the citizen duty to cooperate with 
glass recycling. The failure to communicate this expectation may 
undermine people’s confidence in general cooperation which in turn 
may stifle a latent readiness to cooperate on the side of each single 
individual. 
 
6 A more elaborate discussion of this question can be found, in 
German language, in Hirata (2005 [in print]) and, in English 
language, in Hirata (2006 [forthcoming]). 
